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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, when the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case of
Berkemer v. McCarty,' speculation mounted that the Burger CourtS 2
would finally overrule Miranda v. Arizona. After all, beginning in the
1970s, the Justices had gradually narrowed Miranda's reach, and
Berkemer seemed to present an enticing opportunity to remove it from
the books altogether!
That step the Justices did not take. Writing for a unanimous
Court,4 Justice Marshall may have held against the defendant, but his
opinion reaffirmed a "central principle" established in Miranda: "if
the police take a suspect into custody and then ask him questions
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1 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING
AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE 539 (6th ed. 2007) ("As the Burger Court
gradually narrowed the circumstances under which police had to inform suspects of their
rights, many thought that the Court would overrule Miranda, and Berkemer v. McCarty
(1984) seemed the perfect vehicle.").
4 The vote was 9-0. Justice Stevens concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.
Ber*emer, 468 U.S. at 422, 445.
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without informing him of the rights enumerated [in Miranda], his re-
sponses cannot be introduced into evidence to establish his guilt."5
The problem for defendant McCarty, according to the majority, was
that his "routine" roadside "traffic stop" did not constitute "custody"
for purposes of Miranda.6
To be sure, Berkemer was not a trivial decision. Not only did it hold
that Miranda's "central principle" applies to all crimes, it also elabo-
rated upon the definition of "custody." But it was hardly the block-
buster that many anticipated. Miranda, though wounded, limped on.'
Flash forward a decade-to Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.
When the Justices granted certiorari, presumably to consider the
question of whether the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress
from authorizing tribal suits against the states, their action was
greeted with a collective yawn;' even oral arguments failed to attract
attention.10 But not so of the decision handed down some six months
later. The five-person majority opinion, which precluded Congress
from abrogating state immunity, received front-page coverage in the
5 Id. at 429.
6 Id. at 435, 442.
7 If anything, and consistent with the overall thesis of this Article, Berkemer muddied pre-
existing understandings of custody, moving from a relatively formal test involving the
freedom of the suspect to leave, to one examining whether it is one of those types of
situations in which the concerns that powered the Miranda decision are implicated. Id. at
434.
8 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
9 An "all file" search on Lexis News for "seminole tribe and date(geq (1/20/1995) and leq
(1/25/1995))" retrieved three full stories on the Court's decision to grant cert. T.L.
Henion, Ruling May Affect Scope of Authorized Gambling, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 23,
1995, at 2; David Lightman, Top Court to Hear Indian Gaming Case, HARTFORD COURANT
(Conn.), Jan. 24, 1995, at Al; and James Wallace, Court to Rule on Casinos-Tribe-State Dis-
pute on Constitutional Issue Will Be Heard, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 24, 1995, at
B1. In addition, brief mentions appeared in the Washington Post, the New York Times, and
the Birmingham News. Joan Biskupic, Ruling Gives Death Row Inmates Better Chance for Federal
Review, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1995, at A3; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Rule for Employee in a
Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1995, at Al; High Court to Use State Case to Weigh Punitive-
Award Caps, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Ala.),Jan. 23, 1995, at 8A.
10 In an article appearing the day after oral argument, Linda Greenhouse featured BMW v.
Gore, No. 94-896, only mentioning at the end of the story that
[t]he Court also heard arguments today [in Seminole Tribe] .... With gambling in
Indian-run casinos now a $27-billion-a-year business, the case ... is of substantial
importance to the states and tribes. But in this argument as well, it appeared that
the Justices had developed doubts about whether they could decide the constitu-
tional issues that had attracted them to the case in the first place.
Linda Greenhouse, High Court Examines, Gingerly, Issue of Punitive Damages' Limit, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at A18.
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Los Angeles Times," the New York Times,12 the Baltimore Sun,"2 and even
USA Today.4 Nina Totenberg saw fit to devote part of the next day's
"Morning Edition" to the case, interviewing the Seminole Tribe's at-
torney, the Governor of Florida, and several law professors. Less
than two months later, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held
hearings to study Seminole Tribe's impact on congressional power;6
and nowadays it is standard fare in constitutional law casebooks.
This tale of two cases raises an obvious question: Why did Berkemer
go out with a whimper and Seminole Tribe with a bang? More gener-
ally, assuming that the Justices in the majority can transform any con-
stitutional dispute into a major (or minor!) ruling, what explains
their choice? Several possibilities present themselves, but here we fo-
cus chiefly on the effect of ideological diversity on the nature of the
decisions the Justices render. We argue that the greater the homo-
geneity of the majority, the higher the likelihood of a consequential
decision. 7 Under this argument, it is no accident that Berkemer was a
less consequential decision than Seminole Tribe, for the BerkemerJus-
11 David G. Savage, High Court Curbs Federal Lawsuits Against the States, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28,
1996, at Al.
12 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Curb Federal Power to Subject States to Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 1996, at Al.
13 Lyle Denniston, Court Cuts U.S. Power over States, BALI. SUN, Mar. 28, 1996, at IA.
14 Tony Mauro, Court Ruling Big Boost to States'Rights, USATODAY, Mar. 28, 1996, at IA.
15 Morning Edition: U.S. Supreme Court Rules in Favor of States' Rights (NPR radio broadcast
Mar. 28, 1996) (available on LexisNexis).
16 The decision came down on March 27, 1996; hearings were held on May 9, 1996. See The
Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's Recent Decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. State of
Florida: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 104th Cong. (1996) (statements of
Seth Waxman, Associate Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Department of justice; Richard
Collins, Professor, University of Colorado School of Law; and others regarding the impact
of the Seminole case on congressional powers).
17 This sort of hypothesis stands in some contrast to more common approaches in the legal
academy that see the nature of judicial rulings as a choice the Justices consciously make
regarding whether to be minimal and whether to formulate a rule or a standard. See, e.g.,
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 3-
5 (1999) (arguing that "decisional minimalism," "the phenomenon of saying no more
than necessary tojustify an outcome, and leav[ing] as much as possible undecided," both
promotes democracy and "makes a good deal of sense when the Court is dealing with a
constitutional issue of high complexity about which many people feel deeply and on
which the nation is divided...." (emphasis omitted)); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme
Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 26-27
(1992) (exploring, among other areas, "what might drive the Court's divisions
over.., choices between rules and standards and how such explanations might shed light
on the surprising moderation" of the Court's 1991 Term).
Jan. 2008]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
tices were a far more heterogeneous lot than those who decided
Seminole Tribe.'8
In what follows we test whether our claim and intuition really hold
across a larger set of cases. We attempt to answer this question
through a systematic analysis of the Court's constitutional docket
since the 1953 Term. We begin, in Part II, by contemplating what
constitutes a "consequential" Supreme Court decision. Although
there is no way to capture this concept with absolute precision, what
we have in mind is a decision that makes or changes the law in sig-
nificant ways.
Next, in Part III, we offer a theory for explaining the emergence
of consequential decisions. A variety of factors could influence
whether Supreme Court decisions are consequential, and in our em-
pirical analysis we attend to a number of them. Our primary theo-
retical insight, however, is that there is a relationship between homo-
geneity of the Justices' preferences and noteworthy policy output.
We would note that although this claim is novel in constitutional law
circles, it is widely accepted in the extant literature investigating
group decisions in a variety of other contexts. In Part IV, we turn to
our empirical methodology. We first describe our measures of
consequentiality as well as ideological homogeneity on the Supreme
Court. Then, in Part V, we analyze our data, concluding that in fact a
strong relationship exists between ideological homogeneity and the
generation of consequential decisions. Part VI offers some thoughts
about what this relationship might imply for the making of constitu-
tional law.
II. CONTEMPLATING (IN) CONSEQUENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DECISIONS
Throughout this Article we speak of decisions that are "conse-
quential," "noteworthy," "important," and "path-breaking," but what
do we mean by those terms? We are trying to capture one central in-
sight: the Justices' decisions will have a greater impact on the law
when those deciding the cases are of a like mind. Thus, in using
"consequential" and similar terms, we are indicating that certain
18 As we explain in Part IV, we assess ideological diversity by computing the standard devia-
tion of Martin and Quinn's ideal point estimates for members of the majority vote coali-
tion such that the lower the standard deviation, the higher the homogeneity. Between
the 1953 and 2005 Terms, the mean standard deviation was 1.84. That figure was 2.31 for
the nine-person majority in Berkemer and 1.27 for the five-member majority of Seminole
Tribe.
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cases, as a relative matter, make or change the law in significant ways.
In this Part, we elaborate on this definition and provide some tangi-
ble examples.
To begin, a decision may be consequential if it makes law that is
clear and effective. So, for example, Mapp v. Ohio required state
courts to apply the exclusionary rule when the Fourth Amendment
was violated.'9 This ruling was crisp, and tidal in its impact. Although
no states were claiming an entitlement to ignore the Fourth Amend-
ment, the strong negative reaction of officials indicated Mapp would
require a great change in their practices. Criminal procedure expert
Professor Yale Kamisar said that to listen to the reaction of the police
"[y]ou would have thought we had just passed the Fourth Amend-
ment at a constitutional convention., 20  Kamisar quoted New York
City's Deputy Police Commissioner, who said the case "was a shock to
us. We had to reorganize our thinking, frankly. Before this, nobody
bothered to take out search warrants., 2' The same was true of Engel v.
Vitale,22 which prohibited prayer in schools. "For several days," re-
ported Anthony Lewis in the New York Times, "all the serious business
of the Congress of the United States was put aside while members
spent their time denouncing the Supreme Court."
23
Even if a decision does not make clear, new law, it can still be
noteworthy, however, if it signals a major change in the Court's direc-
tion. Reed v. Reed 4 stands as an example here. Reed was the first case
in which the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a dis-
tinction based on sex. It established little in the way of a new rule;
the Court seemed only to apply rational basis scrutiny in deciding the
case. Yet, no one watching could doubt that a shift had occurred. As
Gerald Gunther said in reaction, "It is difficult to understand [the
Reed] result without an assumption that some special sensitivity to sex
as a classifying factor entered into the analysis.",
25
One particular kind of change in direction may be even more
noteworthy: the overruling case. Thus, Gideon v. Wainwrigh 6 meas-
ures up under two criteria. It established a clear rule that felony de-
19 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
20 Yale Kamisar, When Wasn't There a "Crime Crisis"?, 39 F.R.D. 450, 459 (1965).
21 Id. at 458.
22 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
23 Anthony Lewis, Court Again Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES,July 1, 1962, at 114.
24 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
25 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1972).
26 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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fendants facing jail time were entitled to have lawyers provided if they
were indigent. And Gideon scores again as an overruling case: the
majority overturned (without much sympathy) the prior "special cir-
cumstances" rule of Betts v. Brady.27 Overruling cases, by their nature,
often will establish a clear rule (the opposite of the pre-existing rule).
Yet, even when they are less clear about the precise legal rule, they
may still signal an important change of direction. In Garcia v. San An-
tonio Metropolitan Transit Authority2 ' the Supreme Court clearly over-
ruled National League of Cities v. Useryy. What precisely Garcia por-
tended was a matter of some doubt, as the Court's later federalism
cases made quite clear. Still, it was well understood at the time that
an important shift had occurred.
Some cases are important because of what they do as much as
what they say. A Supreme Court decision overturning an Act of Con-
gress is almost always consequential. Of course, there are some laws
that were so trivial, or that were invalidated in such trivial respects,
that perhaps the law changes little." An example might be Mononga-
hela Navigation Co. v. United States,31 in which the Court struck down a
law concerning the amount of money the United States would pay to
companies for the purchase of a lock and dam in the Monongahela
River. Still, most of the time when a congressional law is overturned,
the impact is important. The Justices at least state rhetorically that
they think long and hard before overturning congressional enact-
ments, and these are relatively rare events.
These four types of cases-those that issue a clear and concise new
legal rule, signal a new policy direction on a salient issue, overrule
precedent, or strike down a federal statute-are just a few examples
of the judicial policies that we believe make a decision noteworthy
and important in the legal canon. Assuming that the foregoing is a
fair, if incomplete, representation of "consequential" cases, for pur-
poses of empirical analysis we need to be able to distinguish between
these cases and those that are only minor contributions to the law.
Before we grapple with this measurement issue, however, we explain
why we believe that ideological homogeneity on the Court will influ-
ence the emergence of consequential Supreme Court decisions.
27 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
28 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
29 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
30 See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 169 (2004) ("[Mlany of the Court's decisions
declaring statutes unconstitutional have been unimportant to the policy goals of Congress
and the president. . .
31 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
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III. THEORIZING ON THE EMERGENCE OF CONSEQUENTIAL PUBLIC
POLICY DECISIONS
In this Article, we seek to understand why some, but not all, Su-
preme Court majorities produce consequential or noteworthy opin-
ions, as defined above. In our analysis of the question, we focus pri-
marily on one distinct dimension of the institutional context that we
expect to be highly correlated with Supreme Court decisions of con-
sequence: the ideological make-up of the majority coalition. We hy-
pothesize that when the Justices are closely aggregated around a sin-
gle ideal point in terms of political preferences, the likelihood of a
consequential decision will substantially increase. We discuss our
theory for why homogeneity of political preferences is linked to cer-
tain types of outcomes in Part III.A below. In Part III.B, and for pur-
poses of specifying a complete model of consequential decision mak-
ing, we very briefly highlight other factors that are likely to be
correlated with the production of these cases.
A. Ideological Diversity and the Nature of Supreme Court Decisions
In this Part, we lay out our theory of consequential decision mak-
ing. Before we elaborate on why ideological homogeneity enables
consequential decision making, however, we ought to note that we
are not the first to consider the role of preference dispersion in the
context of policy output. Indeed, these ideas can be traced back to
the work of James Madison. Madison worried quite a bit about the
possibility that a single group with shared preferences would domi-
nate the national government and would proceed to make laws and
policies that advantaged that group over all other individuals and
communities in society. 32 In The Federalist No. 10, Madison empha-
32 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83 Uames Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison
argued that faction need not be a dreaded component of society. His words are worth
quoting:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests
composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will
a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals
composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed,
the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend
the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interest; you make it
less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult
for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each
other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked, that where there is a con-
sciousness of unjust or dishonourable purpose, communication is always checked
by distrust, in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
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sized the importance of diversity as a means to weaken the ability of
any single, politically homogeneous group to gain control over the
legislative process; Madison, in effect, sought to assure competition
among various groups and to increase the likelihood of compromise
and negotiation in the lawmaking context, all in an effort to dilute
the extremism that he thought would emerge from a national legisla-
ture controlled by a single narrow-minded group.3 In short, Madison
had the intuition-one that we adopt here-that a diverse group of
decision makers will produce policies and programs that look quite a
bit different than those fashioned by a group with homogeneous
preferences. (In our context, however, we make no judgment about
whether decisions by ideologically homogeneous Justices are good or
bad. We simply observe that they are different.)
Madison's instinct has been borne out in numerous studies in a
variety of different contexts. Social scientists have found that impor-
tant and noteworthy laws are far more likely to emerge when the
same political party controls both Congress and the Executive
Branch; a divided government, by contrast, impairs the lawmakers'
ability to enact consequential law.34 Within the House and Senate
chambers individually, scholars also have found that when the major-
ity party becomes more homogeneous, it becomes both more power-
ful and better able to achieve its policy ambitions. 5
These findings about group effectiveness are, we hasten to note,
quite robust and replicated in many different contexts, including
those outside the government sector. Scholars interested in decision
making in the private firm environment, for example, have found
that management teams tend to be quite a bit more successful when
they consist of like-minded thinkers than when they are populated by
33 Id.; see also Kevin R. Gutzman, A Troublesome Legacy: James Madison and "The Principles of
'98," 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 569, 576 (1995) (noting that Madison adopted the counter-
argument to Montesquieu's position that homogeneous majorities assured a more effec-
tive republic).
34 SeeJohn J. Coleman, Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness, 93
AM. POL. SCI. REv. 821 (1999) (arguing that a unified government produces more signifi-
cant legislative enactments and is more responsive to the public mood); Sean Q. Kelly,
Research Note, Divided We Govern? A Reassessment, 25 POLITY 475 (1993) (arguing that di-
vided government negatively impacts the emergence of innovative legislation). But see
Keith Krehbiel, Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unfied
Government, 8J. THEORETICAL POL. 7 (1996) (theorizing that unified governments should
be no more effective than divided governments).
35 See David Brady, Richard Brody & David Epstein, Heterogeneous Parties and Political Organi-
zation: The US. Senate, 1880-1920, 14 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 205 (1989) (noting that homoge-
neous parties are able to appoint powerful and effective committee leaders).
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36individuals with diverse preferences. Similarly, interest groups, un-
ions, and religious organizations appear to be more powerful and ef-
fective in their missions when they are comprised of individuals with
homogeneous preferences.
Our questions are: Do these findings hold in the context of the
U.S. Supreme Court? Do majority coalitions with homogeneous
preferences produce a different kind of opinion than majorities with
ideologically dispersed preferences? In analyzing these questions we
assume-as do many other scholars interested in the role of ideology
in the decision-making process-that we are able to array the indi-
viduals in the group (here, the decision coalition) along an ordinal
left-right policy dimension. It then seems apparent that dispersion of
ideological preferences among the members of winning coalitions
will lead to greater levels of conflict than those observed when mem-
bers are all located at exactly the same point on a policy continuum.
It is this very conflict and disagreement among members of the
Court, or a decision coalition, we argue, that ultimately impedes the
production of a consequential decision.
We believe the Court's decision will be a function of the homoge-
neity of the majority coalition. Consider first a case of unusual and
extreme homogeneity: every single member of the majority coalition
has preferences that rest on the same ideal point in a given policy
space. In this instance, just as Madison suggested, the majority coali-
tion sharing great unity of mind has the ability to adopt whatever rule
it would like, and to impose its preferences on the law. Absent other
constraints (which we do not consider here, though we acknowledge
their existence), 3 that majority coalition will seek to maximize its
preferences.
Contrast the case of a coalition with unified preferences with one
in which the preferences of the majority coalition are widely dis-
36 See Martin Kilduff, Reinhard Angelmar & Ajay Mehra, Top Management-Team Diversity and
Firm Performance: Examining the Role of Cognitions, 11 ORG. SCI. 21 (2000) (finding diversity
in top management negatively correlated with market share increases).
37 See Brad Christerson & Michael Emerson, The Costs of Diversity in Religious Organizations:
An In-Depth Case Study, 64 SOC. RELIGION 163 (2003) (finding that multi-ethnic religious
organizations impose high personal costs on their members); Rebecca S. Demsetz, Voting
Behavior in Union Representation Elections: The Influence of Skill Homogeneity and Skill Group
Size, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 99 (1993) (finding that groups consisting of workers from
the same skill level are more successful at union organizing than are groups of workers
from various skill levels).
38 SeeJeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276 (2007) (describing the semantic difficulty of
drafting an opinion and legal nile right at an ideal point).
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persed. Though the Justices agree on the case disposition, they sim-
ply cannot reach concord on how to get there. In one case, some Jus-
tices in the majority coalition want to overrule a prior precedent,
while others would distinguish it. In another, the inability of the coa-
lition of Justices to agree on a clear rule leads to adoption of a muddy
standard. In each of these instances, we expect that the likelihood of
the Court adopting a consequential decision is minimal, due to the
divergence of viewpoints.
The authority of a majority coalition of ideologically dispersedJus-
tices is further minimized by the ability of each Justice to write his or
her own opinion explaining the judgment. When the preferences
are homogeneous, indeed identical, there is little incentive to write
separately. But the greater the ideological dispersion among the Jus-
tices, the more complicated the decision to write separately becomes.
If the median Justice is writing, and ajustice in the coalition agrees as
to the disposition of the case but, because of sharply divergent ideo-
logical preferences, disagrees as to the rule that justifies that disposi-
tion, that Justice must decide among these options: (a) join the me-
dian Justice opinion, compromising his ideals; (b) write separately,
perhaps depriving the majority of a single binding opinion; or (c)
force the median Justice to compromise her views in drafting an
opinion they both can join. Any choice but (a) likely will minimize
the consequentiality of the decision. Yet, as anyone remotely familiar
with Supreme Court decision making is well aware, choices (b) and
39(c) are common ones.
Indeed, it is the ability of each Justice to write separately that ex-
plains why the predominant median justice theory does not undercut
our intuition that ideological heterogeneity leads to less consequen-
tial decisions. Median justice theory holds that the median Justice
can (and will) control the decision, because if she is not satisfied with
39 Thus our argument turns importantly on the distinction between the judgment and the
opinion in a case. In most (though perhaps not all) instances it is the opinion of the
Court, and not its bottom-line judgment, that determines the consequentiality of the de-
cision. The Supreme Court's choice to award the money to X or to Y, to admit (or not)
the fruits of a police search, to uphold or strike down agency action, matters less to the
future course of the law-and thus to the way behavior is shaped-than how the Court
explains why it is doing so. What is of importance is the way the opinion is written, and
the impact of the opinion on the development of the legal canon. In taking whatever ac-
tion it does, the important aspect is how the Court goes about reaching its judgment,
what new approach the Court carves out to guide future conduct. For example, does the
Court simply distinguish its prior precedents, or does it overrule them? Does the Court
adopt a flexible standard, or a clear, bright-line test? These are the sorts of questions that
bear upon the consequentiality of a decision.
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the outcome she can always threaten to defect to the other side. It is
true that the median Justice holds enormous power over the Court's
judgment, i.e., who wins or loses the case. But it does not follow that
the median Justice can control every detail of the written opinion.
First, the median Justice cannot always credibly threaten to change
sides and dispose of the case differently if she does not get her way in
terms of the content of the opinion. It is unlikely that the median
Justice, who strongly believes a murder conviction must be upheld,
will vote to let the murderer go free simply out of concern that the
opinion admitting the crucial evidence is not written the way she
would like or includes an extra paragraph she believes is superfluous
to the underlying issue in the case. Second, because each Justice may
choose to write separately, if the median Justice does not like the ma-
jority opinion she either will persuade the opinion writer to alter it
down, or will write separately herself. Thus, ideological dispersion
will result in a muddied explanation or a fragmented majority, either
of which will limit the consequentiality of the decision.4 °
The notion that homogeneous groups are more likely to produce
significant output is not a new idea, as we noted above, and it has
been validated in many empirical studies of decision making. We be-
lieve these same insights ought to hold for the Supreme Court; as the
literature in the field ofjudicial politics makes clear, the Justices bar-
gain their way to outcomes and this bargaining impacts the set of pos-
sible policy outcomes. Members of the Court need not-and most
likely do not-commonly sign onto decisions unless those decisions
(a) reach a result with which they agree and (b) are expressed in an
opinion that is at least minimally acceptable. Recognizing this,
Forrest Maltzman,James Spriggs, and Paul Wahlbeck argue that if the
winning coalition is comprised of an ideologically heterogeneous
group, the author of the opinion will make an effort to accommodate
her colleagues. 4' This suggests that heterogeneity is likely to result in
diffusion of the original author's opinion and perhaps then of its im-
pact.
40 For an elaboration and empirical test, see Cliff Carruba, Barry Friedman, Andrew Martin
& Georg Vanberg, Does the MedianJustice Control the Content of Supreme Court Opin-
ions? (Oct. 25, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
41 FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFrING LAW ON THE
SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000).
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B. Other Factors that May Lead to a Consequential Decision
For the reasons we just offered, we believe ideological homogene-
ity plays a role in generating the type of cutting-edge decisions that
attract the attention of legal experts and society-at-large. But only a
role; other factors likely come into play as well. At least three strike
us as useful to incorporate in any effort aimed at explaining conse-
quential constitutional law: the number of Justices in the majority,
the ideology of the majority, and the total number of cases decided in
the Termn
Starting with the size of the majority, while it does not necessarily
follow that the larger the coalition the more heterogeneous it is, it is
plausible that as more Justices sign on to a majority opinion, the less
it would accomplish. This is because as each additional Justice agrees
to sign on, each presumably with his or her preferences, the decision
becomes more and more diluted and thus produces less of an impact
than could be achieved by five simpatico Justices. There are times
when the Justices seek to present a united front, but, and perhaps
contrary to the received wisdom in doing so, they may well limit what
it is they are seeking to accomplish.
Consider in this regard Brown v. Board of Education. Because it
was, after great internal effort, a unanimous decision, it would seem
to disprove our working hypothesis that the smaller the majority vote
coalition, the better positioned it will be to issue a noteworthy deci-
sion. But Brown's subsequent decree "all deliberate speed" 44 lacked
almost any clarity or authoritativeness at all. Viewed in this way,
Brown might actually support the point: to do what needed to be
done, and unanimously, the Court may well have sacrificed a decision
that would have required something clear and unambiguous. Along
similar lines, Reed v. Reed 45 was also a 9-0 decision, and so too would
seem counter to our point about the size of the majority. Note,
though, that the next major sex discrimination case was Frontiero v.
Richardson.46 There, a four Justice plurality adopted strict scrutiny for
42 Other possibilities include the ideological congruency among the branches of govern-
ment and between the Supreme Court and the lower courts. le plan to explore these in
future papers.
43 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) ("[T]he cases are remanded to the Dis-
trict Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with
this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondis-
criminatory basis with all deliberate speed ...
45 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
46 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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gender classifications. Though four otherJustices agreed that the law
in question should be struck down, they were unprepared to adopt
this strict standard while numerous states across the country were
considering the possibility of an Equal Rights Amendment. The
sharp vote disparity between the two decisions shores up, rather than
undercuts, the hypothesis. Then there is our tale of two cases, Berke-
mer and Seminole Tribe.7 We emphasized the role of ideological diver-
sity in generating (in) consequential constitutional law, but was it a
coincidence that Berkemer was unanimous and Seminole Tribe was de-
cided by the slimmest of majorities? Our hypothesis suggests not.
The second factor that the ideology of the majority, rather than
the dispersion of this ideology, captures is the (admittedly arguable,
though nonetheless pervasive) view that majorities populated with
liberals are more likely to render cutting-edge decisions. This is not
unrelated to the frequent claim of conservatives about liberal activ-
ists. Although conservatives can plainly be as activist as liberals, it is
nonetheless true that since 1937 liberal activism has more frequently
taken the form of expanding constitutional meaning, and thus might
garner more attention. This particularly is the case given that, as
some have argued, the conservative revolution at times has been one
more of "stealth," quietly cutting back on existing rules rather than
doing so overtly. Thus, during the Burger Court, commentators
warned of a "covert counterrevolution. Writing in Harper's Maga-
zine, one professor said that though "it might seem that the Court Mr.
Nixon has created has proved far more 'liberal' than the one he envi-
sioned," still "far more is going on than meets the eye."49 He de-
scribed "[t]he techniques of subtle erosion"-the distinguishing of
prior cases or refusal to extend them, the "[s]mall verbal changes"
that have "enormous potential impact.,
50
Finally, it is possible that the sheer number of cases the Court de-
cides in any given Term may impact the likelihood of consequential
decisions; the larger the workload, the less able any given majority is
to produce big decisions. This may not hold: doing important things
does not necessarily take many words. Still, given the possibility, we
47 See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
48 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., An Activism of Ambivalence, 98 HARV. L. REV. 315, 319 (1984) (review-
ing THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent Blasi ed.,
1983)).
49 Paul Bender, The Techniques of Subtle Erosion, HARPER'S MAG., Dec. 1972, at 18.
50 Id. at 20.
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believe it important to consider and control for the number of major-
ity opinions issued.
IV. ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
AND CONSEQUENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
To explore our intuition about the relationship between a homo-
geneous majority and important decisions, we rely on Harold J.
Spaeth's U.S. Supreme Court Database, which contains information
on all Supreme Court cases decided on their merits between the 1953
and 2005 Terms.51 Because our study focuses exclusively on constitu-
tional law, we selected for analysis only those decisions implicating
state or federal constitutional matters.52  The resulting 2,573 cases
constitute our unit of analysis;53 that is, for each decision, we deter-
mine whether it was especially consequential and, ultimately, whether
the degree of homogeneity increased the odds of it being so (even
after controlling for other relevant factors).
This brings us to the crucial parts of our project: devising meas-
ures of (1) our dependent variable, whether a constitutional law deci-
sion is consequential; (2) the key causal variable, ideological diversity;
and (3) additional covariates that may generate important constitu-
tional law. In what follows, we explain our approach to each.
A. Identifying Consequential Decisions
Assuming that our discussion of consequentiality offered in Part II
is a fair, if incomplete, representation of consequential cases in the
sense we mean, how do we measure the concept? We might read all
constitutional cases and code them. Yet, it is apparent that some
types of important cases will be far easier to identify than others. The
database created and maintained by Spaeth already keeps track of
overruling decisions, for example. But at least one of the most im-
portant types of consequential cases will be hard to identify-the case
that creates clear law. Virtually all Supreme Court decisions provide
51 The Database is available at: http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm.
For this Article we rely on the October 2006 version, with analu=0 and dectype=l or 7.
See also infra note 52.
52 That is, from the Spaeth Database, supra note 51, we selected on authdecl/authdec2=1,
2, or 7.
53 Infra note 70 houses descriptive statistics for all variables used in our statistical model.
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some impact on the pre-existing jurisprudence, but it is difficult to
code them reliably and validly in terms of their legal impact. 54
The proxy we adopt for purposes of identifying important Su-
preme Court cases is to track those cases reported on the front page
of the New York Times on the day after the Justices handed down their
decision (hereinafter the "NYT measure") . 5  David Mayhew intro-
duced this approach in his now famous book, Divided We Govern,56 in-
vestigating important legislation emerging from Congress during pe-
riods of divided government. He defined "important" as those laws
reported in the Times.7 Since 1991, countless legislative scholars have
also used this measure; at the same time, Epstein and Segal found it
to be an especially reliable and valid mechanism for identifying sali-
ent Supreme Court cases. 58 For our purposes, it stands to reason that
if the Supreme Court issues an opinion of consequence, a newspaper
of record like the Times ought to cover it. Take for example Roe v.
Wade.59 As history has born out, Roe was an important case. Yet, on
the day that the Court handed it down, Lyndon Johnson died, Henry
Kissinger arrived in Paris for the last round of the Vietnam peace
talks, and GM recalled 37 million cars. Nonetheless, Roe still made it
to the front page.
The potential difficulty with using the NYT measure is that it
might encompass a variety of cases that are newsworthy but not note-
worthy. If the Court decides a case involving a very notable person or
a major corporation, or just one involving a lot of money, that case
might make it onto the front page, although none of these are neces-
sarily very important from a legal standpoint. Consider Dickerson v.
United States, ° in which the Supreme Court did not overrule Miranda
v. Arizona.6 The decision not to overrule was news and deservedly so,
yet in any other sense Dickerson was a thoroughly inconsequential de-
cision.
Notwithstanding the measurement error in our dependent vari-
able, we can remain confident about our choice to rely on the NYT
54 Take our word for it-we're trying!
55 See infra note 69 for a description of this variable and all others in the analysis.
56 DAVID MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN 9 (1991) (introducing the concept of media public-
ity as a measure of identifying important Supreme Court decisions).
57 Id. (defining landmark Supreme Court decisions as those reported on the front page of
the New York Times).
58 Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66 (2000) (not-
ing the benefits of using media coverage to determine the importance of legal issues).
59 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
60 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
61 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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measure for purposes of identifying consequential decisions. Classi-
cal measurement error of the sort we have is absorbed into the dis-
turbance term, which means that the coefficient on our variable of
interest will not be biased-but it will be less efficient. In short, our
empirical model will suffer from increased standard errors, making it
more difficult to identify a correlation between ideological homoge-
neity on the Court and landmark decisions; our measurement strat-
egy has thus made it more difficult, rather than easier, to prove our
hypothesis.2
Finally, we ought to mention that even with this potential prob-
lem, the NYT measure has several advantages over other possible ap-
proaches. Primarily, it is reliable, capable of updating (and backdat-
ing), and not biased in favor of liberal or conservative decisions or
63particular types of cases. Further, in important regards, the NYT
measure is a valid measure of the concept we seek to animate. While
a small fraction of cases might have made it onto Epstein and Segal's
list because they were newsworthy, and not noteworthy, we would
challenge scholars to identify an important, consequential, or cutting-
edge case that the Times failed to cover on its front page.
B. Ideological Diversity
6 4
If our measure of the dependent variable in this account, conse-
quential constitutional law, is not without its share of difficulties, our
approach to ideological homogeneity or, if you prefer, heterogeneity
is less freighted. Actually, political scientists have offered a number
of creative approaches to assess it. For our purposes, though, the
Martin-Quinn ideal point estimates, derived from the votes cast by the
Justices and a Bayesian modeling strategy, are, well, nearly ideal.65
62 See, e.g., WiLLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIc ANALYSIS 84-85 (5th ed. 2003).
63 See Epstein & Segal, supra note 58, at 73-77 (subjecting the NYT measure to a battery of
tests to assess biases and cross-validating it). The NYT measure performs well on all their
tests. They also demonstrate that the "percentage of liberal decisions (58.2) covered on
the front page of the Times roughly matches the overall figure of 52.2 percent." Id. at 76.
64 While the majority vote coalition in any given case could be diverse on any number of
dimensions-family background, religious affiliation, jurisprudential approach, and so
on-our account stresses ideological diversity: the more homogeneous the majority, the
more likely it will be to issue a consequential opinion. The measure sketched in this Part
follows from that account.
65 Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain
Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). The up-
dated ideal point estimates, along with all other data used in this study, are available at:
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/homogeneity.html. For the sake of com-
pleteness, we also conducted the following analyses substituting the Segal-Cover scores for
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They are dynamic, valid, reliable, and, last but not least, available for
each Term and Justice in our study.6
With the Martin-Quinn ideal point estimates in hand, we turned
to the Spaeth Database to identify the members of the majority vote
coalition in each constitutional case decided between the 1953 and
2005 Terms. To each member we attached his or her Martin-Quinn
estimate and then computed a simple but powerful measure of ho-
mogeneity: the Martin-Quinn standard deviation of the majority coali-
tion in each case.67
C. Other Factors that May Lead to a Consequential Decision
For the reasons we offered in Part III, we believe ideological ho-
mogeneity plays a role in generating cutting-edge decisions. But only
a role; other factors likely come into play as well. At least three strike
us as useful to incorporate in any effort aimed at explaining conse-
quential constitutional law: the number of Justices in the majority,
the total number of cases decided in the term, and the ideology of
the majority.6 The first two are self-explanatory. For the ideology of
the majority, we take the mean of the Martin-Quinn scores for Jus-
tices in the majority vote coalition.
Two other variables tap particular circumstances that almost cer-
tainly will be consequential: when the Court alters its own precedent
or overturns a law passed by Congress. The rarity of these events
the Martin-Quinn estimates. The results are statistically and substantively indistinguish-
able.
66 We, of course, are not the first to deploy the Martin-Quinn estimates. To the contrary,
despite their relative youth, they have received a good deal of play in the law reviews. See,
e.g., Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. LJ. 123, 135
(2003) (explaining that the Martin-Quinn estimates do not consider the influence of
Congress upon the Supreme Court's decision-making process); Andrew D. Martin, Kevin
M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L.
REV. 1275, 1307-15 (2005) (applying the Martin-Quinn method to map the ideological
shift of Justice O'Connor and to determine whether President George W. Bush can influ-
ence the Court's ideological shift); Theodore W. Ruger, Justice Harty Blackmun and the
Phenomenon ofJudicial Preference Change, 70 Mo. L. REv. 1209, 1213 (2005) (using the Mar-
tin-Quinn estimates to illustrate the dramatic shift in Justice Blackmun's voting prefer-
ences); Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 154
U. PA. L. REv. 1729, 1754 (2006) (employing the Martin-Quinn estimates to explain Chief
Justice Rehnquist's decision to assign opinion writing to a variety ofJustices with different
ideologies).
67 See infra note 69 for a description of this variable and all others in the analysis.
68 Other possibilities include the ideological congruency among the branches of govern-
ment and between the Supreme Court and the lower courts. We plan to explore these in
a future paper.
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likely also makes them more newsworthy-a concept our dependent
variable, for better or worse, surely taps-and so these should be in
our model. To incorporate them, we rely on Spaeth's codings under
his variables "alt-prec" (alteration of precedent) and "uncon" (over-
turn federal law).69
V. RESULTS
In sum, for this preliminary analysis we posit that three variables,
in addition to ideological diversity, are likely to affect the ability of
the Court's majority to produce a consequential decision: its size, its
ideology, and the number of decisions handed down in a given Term.
The measurement of our dependent variable also counsels in favor of
analyzing precedential and congressional overrulings.
We begin, though, with a simple inspection of the basic relation-
ship we seek to assess, between ideological diversity and the eminence
of the constitutional law the Court produces. To conduct it, we esti-
mated a bivariate logistic regression of whether a decision is conse-
quential on the degree of ideological homogeneity.
Though the results are of limited value, they are not unencourag-
ing. For starters, the coefficient on Ideological Diversity is statistically
significant (p < 0.05) and correctly signed; in other words, higher de-
grees of ideological homogeneity are statistically associated with
higher odds of producing a consequential decision." Moreover, the
69 A description of the variables in our analysis is as follows (N=2573):
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Consequential Cases 0.23 0.42 0 1
Ideological Diversity of the Majority 1.85 0.57 0.36 3.99
Number of Justices in the Majority 6.83 1.54 4 9
Ideology of the Majority 0.15 0.97 -2.25 2.01
Number of Cases 115.15 24.98 65 151
Overturn Precedent 0.04 0.19 0 1
Overturn Federal Law 0.03 0.16 0 1
Note that for Ideological Diversity of the Majority and Number of Justices in the Majority, we
define "majority" as the vote majority, and not the opinion majority. Because using the opinion
majority would, if anything, bias the results in favor of our hypothesis, we begin with the
tougher test. In future work, we will consider both types of majority membership.
70 The estimates are as follows (where * indicates p _ 0.05, and Std. Errs. are robust):
Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Ideological Diversity of the Majority -0.343* (0.083)
Intercept -0.563* (0.156)
N 2573
Log-likelihood -13.91.056
X2 - 17.06
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effect of Ideological Diversity is substantively noticeable. Moving
from the most homogeneous majorities, to mean levels, to the most
heterogeneous precipitously decreases the odds of a noteworthy deci-
sion, from 0.33 to 0.23 to 0.13.71 Overall, we predict a 21% decline in
the likelihood of producing important constitutional law as Ideologi-
cal Diversity changes from its minimum (lowest standard deviation)
to its maximum (highest standard deviation) values.
A. Multivariate Analysis
These initial findings may seem impressive, but do they hold when
we control for the other factors that may affect the probability of a
consequential decision? From a statistical standpoint, as Table 1 be-
low shows, the answer is straightforward: the estimate of Ideological
Diversity remains statistically significant and correctly signed. Ditto
for the other coefficients.
TABLE 1
THE EFFECT OF IDEOLOGICAL DIVERSITY ON THE CREATION OF A
CONSEQUENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DECISION
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Ideological Diversity of the Majority -0.428 * (0.116)
Number ofJustices in the Majority -0.164 * (0.037)
Ideology of the Majority -0.288 * (0.058)
Number of Cases -0.006 * (0.002)
Overturn Precedent i.110 * (0.210)
Overturn Federal Law 1.547 * (0.258)
Constant 1.259 * (0.315)
N 2573
Log-likelihood -1319.573
x2 (153.783
* represents p < 0.05. Standard errors are robust.
71 The 95% confidence intervals are [0.28, 0.39], [0.22, 0.25], and [0.09, 0.17], respectively.
Produced using SPost, available at http://www.indiana.edu/-jslsoc/spost.htm.
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The far more important question, though, is whether the statisti-
cal results-especially those pertaining to ideological diversity-exert
strong substantive effects on constitutional law. To address it, we
consider several plausible scenarios, with Figure 1 displaying the most
relevant for our project. There we show the effect of homogeneity on
the probability of the Court producing an important constitutional
decision when we set the size of the majority at 5, 7, and 9 persons-
in other words, the (approximate) minimum, mean, and maximum
values of Number of Justices in the majority.
FIGURE 1
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Ideological Diversity (from Most to Least Homogeneous)
Figure 1: The effect of ideological diversity, for three sizes of the majority
vote coalition, on the likelihood of a consequential constitutional law de-
cision. The panels show the predicted probability of the Court produc-
ing an important constitutional decision when we set the size of the
Court's majority at its (approximate) minimum (5), mean (7), and
maximum (9) values over the range of Ideological Diversity (the closer to
0 the more ideologically homogeneous the majority). In all panels, Ide-
ology of the Majority and Number of Cases are set at their means, and
Overturn Precedent and Overturn Federal Law are set at their modes
(0). The vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. We gener-
ated this figure using SPost, with bootstrapped confidence intervals.
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Focusing first on our primary intuition about the relationship be-
tween ideological diversity and important constitutional law, the
takeaway from Figure 1 is obvious: regardless of the size of the major-
ity, the more homogeneous the Court, the more likely it is to produce
a consequential decision. With all other variables held at their mean
(or mode), including the Number of Justices, the probability of an
extremely heterogeneous majority generating a noteworthy decision
is just 0.09;72 that figure increases to 0.3373 if the majority is extremely
homogeneous.
As we can observe, though, the size of the majority is hardly sub-
stantively irrelevant. All else being equal, a minimum winning major-
ity (e.g., five votes out of a nine-Justice Court if all are hearing the
case) will produce a consequential decision in about one out of every
four cases.74 At the highest levels of homogeneity, that figure in-
creases to 40 %.75 For unanimous majorities, conversely, the pre-
dicted probability of generating an important decision never exceeds
760.26, even when they are highly homogeneous; the odds drop as low
as 0.07 when they are highly heterogeneous. 7 Hence, conventional
wisdom aside, it is the homogeneous, five-person coalition-and not
a unanimous Court-that is more likely to generate decisions of con-
sequence.
Where the conventional wisdom may have it right is about ideol-
ogy. For decades, various political communities have contended that
liberals are more likely to produce "big" decisions, and our data sug-
gest that they are not wrong. Consider Figure 2, in which we depict
the change in the predicted probability of a consequential opinion
across the range of values of Ideological Diversity for very liberal, "av-
erage," and very conservative majority coalitions. Notice that the
predicted probability of even an extremely homogeneous conserva-
tive majority generating a consequential decision is a rather unlikely
0.22; that figure increases to 0.50 when it is extremely liberal (and
homogeneous). We stress, yet again, that these results obtain in a
post-1937 world; the outcomes might well differ were we examining
the period of conservative activism during the Lochner era.
72 The 95% confidence interval is [0.06, 0.15].
73 The 95% confidence interval is [0.26, 0.41].
74 The probability is 0.26, with a 95% confidence interval of [0.23, 0.29].
75 The 95% confidence interval is [0.33, 0.47].
76 The 95% confidence interval is [0.18, 0.36].
77 The 95% confidence interval is [0.04, 0.10].
78 The other variables are set at their mean or mode.
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FIGURE 2
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Figure 2: The effect of ideological diversity, by the ideology of the major-
ity vote coalition, on the likelihood of a consequential constitutional law
decision. The figure shows the predicted probability of the Court pro-
ducing an important constitutional decision when we set the ideology of
the majority coalition at its most liberal, average, and most conservative
levels over the range of Ideological Diversity (the closer to 0 the more
ideologically homogeneous the majority). Number of Justices in the Ma-
jority and Number of Cases are set at their means, and Overturn Prece-
dent and Overturn Federal Law are set at their modes (0). We generated
this figure using SPost.
B. The Roberts Court
Owing to the scenarios they depict, Figures 1 and 2, while interest-
ing, may be uninformative about the contemporary Roberts Court.
For example, in Figure 1 we set Ideology of the Majority at its mean
level (0.15), which is a good deal more liberal than the current Court
(0.36). Likewise, for Figure 2, in which we varied Ideology of the Ma-
jority, we set the number of cases per Term at its mean (115) which,
for the 2005 Term, is high (72 in 2005).
To consider the implications of our results for the current Court,
some adjustments are thus in order. They are reflected in the two
panels in Figure 3 below, in which we allowed the 2005 Term to dic-
tate the hypothetical. The top display emphasizes the effect of ideo-
logical diversity by the size of the majority when Ideology of the Ma-
(Vol. 10:2
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jority and Number of Cases are at their 2005 Term means; the bot-
tom panel highlights ideology, showing the most liberal, average, and
most conservative values during the Roberts Court.
FIGURE 3
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Figure 3: Ideological diversity and the first Term of the Roberts Court.
The panels show the predicted probability of the Court producing an
important constitutional decision across the 2005 Term's range of Ideo-
logical Diversity (the closer to 0 the more ideologically homogeneous the
majority). The top panel emphasizes the size of the Court's majority at
its (approximate) minimum (5), mean (7), and maximum (9), when we
set Ideology of the Majority and Number of Cases at their 2005 Term
means and all other variables at their means or modes. The bottom
panel highlights the ideology of the majority at its 2005 most liberal, av-
erage, and most conservative values, when we set the size of the majority
and the number of cases at their 2005 Term means and all other vari-
ables at their means or modes. We generated this figure using SPost.
As even a mere glance at Figure 3 would reveal, the patterns are
quite similar to those we observe for the entire period: increases in
the size of the majority and its relative conservatism are associated
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with decreases in the predicted probability of a consequential deci-
sion across the range of Ideological Diversity. Depending upon the
particular scenario, however, the substantive effects may not be as
strong. Consider, for example, the formation of a minimum winning
coalition of the most liberal and, crucially, the most homogeneous
Justices-in other words, the scenario across our data most likely to
produce a consequential decision.79 Were such a majority to emerge,
we would predict, on average, the generation of important law in
nearly six out of every ten decisions;0 for the Roberts Court, the fig-
ure is closer to about 50 percent.8 ' Were the current Justices to de-
cide more cases per Term-an end the Chief Justice seems to en-
dorse-the production of consequential constitutional law would
decline even further. Adding approximately 25 cases would bring the
predicted probability to under 0.50;12 moving to 115 cases, the mean
level across the fifty year period, would likely result in a further re-
duction.3
Even more to the point, a constitutional law maximizing coalition
(i.e., very liberal, homogeneous, and small) certainly does not pre-
dominate on the Roberts Court. In only two of the thirty-one consti-
tutional law cases of the 2005 Term did such a majority form (Breyer,
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, plus O'Connor or Kennedy). And,
even when it did, as the results above suggest, it was more conserva-
tive than the five- and six-person vote coalitions of the Warren Court
years.
VI. DISCUSSION
Word has it that Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. would ask his law
clerks to tell him the most important rule in constitutional law. He
would then hold up his hand, showing all five fingers. His point?
Five was the minimum number of Justices required to make constitu-
tional law.
What this Article indicates is that Brennan's rule gets it only par-
tially right. Were Justice Brennan writing for himself and a random
draw of four others, our analysis predicts a far higher likelihood of
79 Or at least when Overturn Precedent and Overturn Federal Law are set at 0.
80 The probability is 0.57, with a 95% confidence interval of [0.46, 0.69].
81 The probability is 0.51, with a 95% confidence interval of [0.43, 0.60].
82 The probability would be 0.47, with a 95% confidence interval of [0.40, 0.55].
83 The probability would then be 0.45, with a 95% confidence interval of [0.37, 0.53].
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producing a decision of some import than if he were writing for all
his colleagues.84
Where Brennan's answer falls short is in treating all votes as the
same. They are not. Based on our analysis, we would be prepared to
bet that an opinion written by Brennan (or any other Justice) would
have a greater impact if his four closest alliesjoined it than if he were
forced to cobble together a majority from across the Court's ideo-
logical spectrum. The decision of a five-person homogeneous major-
ity is three times more likely than the decision of a five-person het-
erogeneous majority to generate consequential constitutional law.
If we are right, then perhaps it is no accident that so often in his-
tory when the Supreme Court has been under siege it is for a string of
54 decisions. During the Lochner era, for example, members of Con-
gress, frustrated by the number of important decisions striking laws
by the slimmest of margins, proposed requiring a supernajority be-
fore the Court could strike a federal statute.85 Although this proposal
went nowhere, a similar requirement was adopted in four states.86
Complaints of this nature have been leveled more recently at the
decisions of the Federalism Five of the Rehnquist Court. It stands to
reason that discontent with the Court will track the periods of com-
plaint about 5-4 decisions. On balance, a strong five may be able to
do more, and thus rouse more controversy.
While the positive explanation for this phenomenon is interest-
ing, the normative implications are less clear. What our analysis sug-
gests is that the objection to 5-4 decisions is not merely that the Court
was closely divided, but paradoxically, that it is in precisely these cases
that the Court is accomplishing most. To the extent that public ac-
ceptance of Supreme Court decisions is tied to the size of the deci-
sion majority, and there is some evidence that it is, the Court will be
acting in the less acceptable manner at precisely the same time that it
is having the largest impact on the existing body of law.
What one does with this insight is complicated, but still it is in-
structive. For example, there have been instances in history in which
84 The difference in probability is 0.26 [0.23, 0.29] versus 0.15 [0.13, 0.18], with all variables
held at the mean or mode, except size.
85 See, e.g., Borah for Limiting High Court's Veto, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1923, at 4 (noting the in-
troduction of a bill that would require at least seven votes for the Supreme Court to de-
clare an Act of Congress unconstitutional).
86 The original four states were Ohio, North Dakota, Nebraska, and South Carolina; North
Dakota and Nebraska retain a supermajority requirement today. SeeJed Handelsman
Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviing Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA.
L. REv. 893, 954 (2003).
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calls have been made to require a supermajority before the Justices
strike down an Act of Congress. Though there are strong counter-
vailing arguments, it is easy to see why such calls have been made. It
is undoubtedly easier, as we explain, to get five votes to overturn a
congressional law than to get more.
On the other hand, suggestions that the Justices work harder to
reach agreement may prove counterproductive. These suggestions
are made on the theory that greater consensus lends greater legiti-
macy and clarity to the law. Yet our analysis would indicate that the
more Justices who join in an opinion, the less clear the law might be,
depending on the ideological homogeneity of the Court. Thus, it
might be that requiring at least five Justices makes sense, so that there
is a majority' opinion, but if clarity is what one is after, there may be
diminishing returns thereafter.
Finally, the implications for the appointments process are evident,
even though what one should prefer may not be. To the extent one
wants an activist court, the means of accomplishing this are obvious:
appoint at least five Justices of like mind. On the other hand, ideo-
logical diversity will diminish activism. Thus, allowing any one Presi-
dent, or several congruent Presidents of the same party, to appoint
several Justices is likely to increase activism, especially in an environ-
ment in which ideology is such an important determinant of who gets
appointed. Recent proposals to regularize appointment to the Su-
preme Court are indeterminate, as what matters is who gets to do the
appointing and who gets appointed.
[Vol. 10:2
